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PIERCING THE HEALTHCARE VEIL: AN ARGUMENT FOR
HEALTHCARE PRICING TRANSPARENCY
INTRODUCTION
Jeanne Pinder, former New York Times journalist and current healthcare
pricing transparency advocate, called doctors and hospitals throughout the
United States and asked a simple question: “What would you accept as a cash
payment for an MRI, a blood test or an Echocardiogram?” 1 Jeanne received
hang-ups from some and the run-around from others, but the prices quoted from
those willing to help was startling. 2 In the New York City area, paying cash for
an Echocardiogram in Brooklyn cost $200. 3 Just a few miles away in Manhattan,
the same Echocardiogram cost $2,150. 4 A blood test in New Orleans cost $19 at
one provider and $522 at a different provider a few blocks away. 5 In San
Francisco, an MRI cost $475 at one location and the same MRI cost $6,221 at a
location 25 miles away. 6 The question stemming from these responses is “why?”
Why is there a 975% difference in cost of an Echocardiogram in Brooklyn and
Manhattan? A 2,647% difference in cost for the same blood test in New Orleans?
A 1,209% difference in cost for the same MRI in San Francisco?
Contributing in part to the immense margins in price for the same test or
procedure is the current opaqueness of pricing within the healthcare industry.7
Being a consumer of shoppable services, the term for healthcare procedures that
can be planned for in advance, is unlike any other aspect of the consumer
experience in America. 8 For example, the patient receiving a $522 blood test in
New Orleans has no idea about the test’s cost before she receives it, or that the
same blood test is only $19 at another provider within walking distance. 9
Other issues with the wide price margins of shoppable services among
different providers is the rising cost of healthcare and the increasing burden of

1
TED, What if all US health care costs were transparent? / Jeanne Pinder, YOUTUBE (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZjeZ8r7yWOk.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Maria Castellucci et al., Achieving transparency in healthcare, MOD. HEALTHCARE, https://www.
modernhealthcare.com/reports/achieving-transparency-in-healthcare/#!/.
8
Id.
9
TED, What if all US health care costs were transparent? / Jeanne Pinder, YOUTUBE (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZjeZ8r7yWOk.
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out-of-pocket expenditures on patients. 10 Overall healthcare costs—including
all private and public spending—are anticipated to rise by an average of 5.5%
per year over the next decade—growing from $3.5 trillion in 2017 to $6 trillion
by 2027. 11 Healthcare spending is projected to grow faster than the economy,
increasing from 17.9% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2017 to 19.4% of
GDP in 2027. 12 While healthcare costs continue to rise, increased enrollment in
high-deductible health plans (HDHPs) and co-insurance healthcare plans, in
which patients pay a percentage of the amount of a test or procedure, result in
patients bearing a greater financial burden to access care. 13
To address these issues, President Donald Trump issued the highly
anticipated Executive Order 13877, Improving Price and Quality Transparency
in American Healthcare to Put Patients First, on healthcare price and quality
transparency on June 24, 2019. 14 The Executive Order calls for increased
transparency of healthcare pricing and quality information, citing the need to
take on opaque pricing structures that benefit special interest groups. 15 The
Trump Administration wants to enable consumers to make fully informed
decisions about their healthcare by ensuring they know the price and quality of
a good or service in advance. 16 Increased transparency, in the Administration’s
view, would help to protect patients from surprise medical bills: by knowing cost
information in advance, patients could avoid unexpected and excessive charges
from out-of-network providers. 17 Executive Order 13877 significantly
emphasizes the disclosure of “actual” prices of shoppable services by providers
and insurers, also known as the negotiated price of a shoppable service after

10
Peter G. Peterson Found., Healthcare Costs for Americans Projected to Grow at an Alarmingly High
Rate, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND. (May 1, 2019), https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2019/05/healthcare-costs-foramericans-projected-to-grow-at-an-alarmingly-high-rate.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Gary Claxton et al., Increases in cost-sharing payments continue to outpace wage growth, PETERSONKFF HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (June 15, 2018), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/increases-in-costsharing-payments-have-far-outpaced-wage-growth/; Robin A. Cohen, Ph.D. et al., High-deductible Health Plan
Enrollment Among Adults Aged 18-64 With Employment-based Insurance Coverage, 317 NCHS DATA BRIEF 1,
1 (2018).
14
Exec. Order No. 13,877, 3 C.F.R. § 30849 (2019).
15
Exec. Order No. 13,877, 3 C.F.R. § 30849 (2019); Katie Keith, Unpacking The Executive Order On
Health Care Price Transparency And Quality, HEALTHAFFAIRS (June 25, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hblog20190625.974595/full/.
16
Katie Keith, Unpacking The Executive Order On Health Care Price Transparency And Quality,
HEALTHAFFAIRS (June 25, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190625.974595/full/.
17
Id.
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taking into account the percentage of the hospital’s list price that the insurer is
willing to cover. 18
In furtherance of the policies enumerated in Executive Order 13877, the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) published a Final Rule and a
Proposed Rule in the Federal Register that aim to increase the transparency of
hospital and insurer prices on November 27, 2019. 19 The Final Rule, effective
January 1, 2021, requires hospitals to provide patients with easily accessible
information about standard charges, including payer-specific negotiated rates for
items and services offered. 20 The Proposed Rule would require issuers and
health plans to publish provider-specific negotiated rates and give members
personalized out-of-pocket cost estimates. 21 The comment period for the
Proposed Rule concludes on January 27, 2020. 22
According to the Final Rule, United States hospitals must publish a machinereadable list of standard charges for each item or service provided in the hospital
inpatient setting or outpatient department setting that is “easily accessible.”23
United States hospitals must also include a description of each item or service
provided and any code used by the hospital for the purposes of accounting or

18

Id.
Exec. Order No. 13,877, 3 C.F.R. § 30849 (2019); Transparency in Coverage, 84 Fed. Reg. 229
(proposed Nov. 27, 2019); Rujul Desai et al., CMS Releases Final Hospital Price Transparency Rule and
Proposes Transparency Rule for Health Plans, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=4ae25cbe-a21b-4387-81ab-3e81c058c417.
20
Medicare and Medicaid Programs: CY 2020 Hospital Outpatient PPS Policy Changes and Payment
Rates and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System Policy Changes and Payment Rates. Price Transparency
Requirements for Hospitals To Make Standard Charges Public, 84 Fed. Reg. 65524, 65525 (Nov. 27, 2019);
Rujul Desai et al., CMS Releases Final Hospital Price Transparency Rule and Proposes Transparency Rule for
Health Plans, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4ae25cbe-a21b4387-81ab-3e81c058c417.
21
Transparency in Coverage, 84 Fed. Reg. 229 (proposed Nov. 27, 2019); Rujul Desai et al., CMS
Releases Final Hospital Price Transparency Rule and Proposes Transparency Rule for Health Plans,
LEXOLOGY (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4ae25cbe-a21b-4387-81ab3e81c058c417.
22
Id.
23
23
Medicare and Medicaid Programs: CY 2020 Hospital Outpatient PPS Policy Changes and Payment
Rates and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System Policy Changes and Payment Rates. Price Transparency
Requirements for Hospitals To Make Standard Charges Public, 84 Fed. Reg. 65524, 65525 (Nov. 27, 2019).
Easily accessible means available free of charge, accessible without having to register or establish a user account
or password, accessible without having to submit personal identifying information, and digitally searchable.
According to the final rule, standard charges include gross charges, payer-specific negotiated charges (with thirdparty payer and plan identified), de-identified minimum negotiated charges, de-identified maximum negotiated
charges, and a discounted cash price, if applicable.
19
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billing for the item or service. 24 The Final Rule also demands that hospitals
display payer-specific negotiated rates and discounted cash prices for a limited
set of 300 shoppable services in an easy-to-read format. 25 Hospitals can meet
this requirement by offering an easily accessible, consumer-friendly list that is
searchable by service description, billing code and payer. 26 Alternatively,
hospitals can offer an online price estimator tool, prominently displayed on the
provider’s website, that allows patients to instead obtain an estimate of the
amount they will be obligated to pay. 27
Regarding hospital noncompliance, the Final Rule establishes that
individuals and entities may file complaints against a hospital, subject to an
independent CMS review, in addition to CMS audits of hospitals websites. 28
CMS will provide a written warning notice to the hospital specifying the
violations if CMS concludes that a hospital is noncompliant with one or more of
the price transparency requirements after independent analysis . 29 CMS’ written
warning notice provides the hospital an opportunity to take voluntary corrective
action without incurring any penalties. 30 If CMS determines that a hospital
remains in noncompliance after a written warning notice was issued, the

24

Id. at 65560.
Id. at 65567. According to the Final Rule, the list of 300 shoppable services is required to include
seventy CMS-specified services, plus as many additional hospital-selected shoppable services as necessary for
at least 300 services total. If a hospital does not provide 300 shoppable services, it must provide standard charges
for whatever services it does provide. Charge information must include charges for corresponding “ancillary
services” provided in conjunction with each shoppable primary service. If the hospital does not offer a discounted
cash price, it must list its undiscounted gross charge.
26
Id. at 65,579 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 180.60(d)); R. Ross Burris III et al., CMS Issues New Final
Rule on Pricing Transparency, Natl. L. Rev. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cmsissues-new-final-rule-pricing-transparency.
27
Medicare and Medicaid Programs: CY 2020 Hospital Outpatient PPS Policy Changes and Payment
Rates and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System Policy Changes and Payment Rates. Price Transparency
Requirements for Hospitals To Make Standard Charges Public, 84 Fed. Reg. 65524, 65579 (Nov. 27, 2019) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. 180.60(a)(2)); R. Ross Burris III et al., CMS Issues New Final Rule on Pricing
Transparency, Natl. L. Rev. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cms-issues-new-final-rulepricing-transparency.
28
Id. at 65582; R. Ross Burris III et al., CMS Issues New Final Rule on Pricing Transparency, Natl. L.
Rev. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cms-issues-new-final-rule-pricing-transparency.
29
Id. at 65582 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 180.70); R. Ross Burris III et al., CMS Issues New Final Rule
on Pricing Transparency, Natl. L. Rev. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cms-issuesnew-final-rule-pricing-transparency.
30
Medicare and Medicaid Programs: CY 2020 Hospital Outpatient PPS Policy Changes and Payment
Rates and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System Policy Changes and Payment Rates. Price Transparency
Requirements for Hospitals To Make Standard Charges Public, 84 Fed. Reg. 65524, 65584 (Nov. 27, 2019) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. 180); R. Ross Burris III et al., CMS Issues New Final Rule on Pricing Transparency,
Natl. L. Rev. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cms-issues-new-final-rule-pricingtransparency.
25
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noncompliance constitutes a material violation of the Final Rule. 31 CMS will
then issue a notice of violation and require the hospital to submit a Corrective
Action Plan (CAP). 32 Failure of a hospital in material violation of the Final Rule
to submit a CAP in the form requested or to abide by the terms of an approved
CAP permits CMS to impose Civil Monetary Penalties (CMPs) on the
noncompliant hospital, which must be paid in full within sixty days of the
hospital receiving notice of the CMP’s imposition. 33 Continuing violations by
noncompliant hospitals may result in additional CMPs until compliance is
maintained. 34
CMS’ Final and Proposed Rules, by furthering the policies in Executive
Order 13877, will facilitate fiscal responsibility within the healthcare industry,
decrease the margin in price between different providers of shoppable services
and promote consumer choice. 35 Currently there is no incentive for healthcare
providers to be cognizant of the cost of shoppable services, and CMS rules
furthering the policies set forth in Executive Order 13877 provides the necessary
incentives for the healthcare industry to reign in out of control pricing for
shoppable services. 36
This Comment analyzes the current problem of opaqueness regarding patient
access to pricing of shoppable services within the healthcare industry, the trend
of increasing out-of-pocket costs paid by patients for shoppable services, and
31
Medicare and Medicaid Programs: CY 2020 Hospital Outpatient PPS Policy Changes and Payment
Rates and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System Policy Changes and Payment Rates. Price Transparency
Requirements for Hospitals To Make Standard Charges Public, 84 Fed. Reg. 65524, 65586 (Nov. 27, 2019) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. 180.80). According to the Final Rule, Material Violation means a hospital’s failure to
make its prices public or to display prices in the manner and form required by the Final Rule.
32
Medicare and Medicaid Programs: CY 2020 Hospital Outpatient PPS Policy Changes and Payment
Rates and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System Policy Changes and Payment Rates. Price Transparency
Requirements for Hospitals To Make Standard Charges Public, 84 Fed. Reg. 65524, 65604 (Nov. 27, 2019) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. 180.80).
33
R. Ross Burris III et al., CMS Issues New Final Rule on Pricing Transparency, Natl. L. Rev. (Nov. 25,
2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cms-issues-new-final-rule-pricing-transparency.
34
Id.
35
Exec. Order No. 13,877, 3 C.F.R. § 30849 (2019); Medicare and Medicaid Programs: CY 2020
Hospital Outpatient PPS Policy Changes and Payment Rates and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System
Policy Changes and Payment Rates. Price Transparency Requirements for Hospitals To Make Standard Charges
Public, 84 Fed. Reg. 65524 (Nov. 27, 2019); Transparency in Coverage, 84 Fed. Reg. 229 (proposed Nov. 27,
2019).
36
Exec. Order No. 13,877, 3 C.F.R. § 30849 (2019); Medicare and Medicaid Programs: CY 2020
Hospital Outpatient PPS Policy Changes and Payment Rates and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System
Policy Changes and Payment Rates. Price Transparency Requirements for Hospitals To Make Standard Charges
Public, 84 Fed. Reg. 65524 (Nov. 27, 2019); Transparency in Coverage, 84 Fed. Reg. 229 (proposed Nov. 27,
2019).
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how consolidation among health care providers contributes to increased costs to
patients. Analysis of the price transparency in the cosmetic procedure industry
and successful state healthcare price transparency initiatives is conducted to
demonstrate that transparency in pricing can contribute to increased
competition, consumer knowledge and lower costs of shoppable services.
Finally, this Paper concludes with suggestions for both federal and state-level
policymakers on the proper course of action for putting patients’ interests first
by putting insurance companies and healthcare conglomerates second.
I.

THE STATUS QUO OF HEALTHCARE PRICE OPAQUENESS KEEPS
PRICES HIGH

Imagine walking into Best Buy with the desire to purchase a television. 37 A
nice flat screen catches your eye and meets your needs, but Best Buy maintains
a policy of not posting prices for their goods in store or on the internet. 38 After
summoning a Best Buy employee to inform you about the price of the television,
she assures you, of course, that you are getting the deal of the century. 39 “You
hit the jackpot today, the list price of this television is $15,000, but after a hearty
discount you only have to pay $3,500 to take this television home with you!”40
You ask the Best Buy employee why prices are not publicly available, and she
gets mad at you, saying, “Nobody pays the list price for televisions anyways,
who cares?” 41 You shrug it off and purchase the television, because Netflix is
not going to watch itself.
The above is analogous to the current opaqueness within the negotiation
process between hospitals and insurers, which is part of the scheme to keep
prices high. 42 Hospitals use a list price, similar to a MSRP or retail price of other
goods, as the starting number in negotiating the percentage of the list price that
insurers will cover for their policy holders. 43 Hospitals compile list prices of all
billable services and items into a hospital chargemaster, which captures the costs

37
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Analysis: Pulling Back Curtain On Hospital Prices Adds New Wrinkle In Cost
Control, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 28, 2019), https://khn.org/news/analysis-pulling-back-curtain-on-hospitalprices-adds-new-wrinkle-in-cost-control/.
38
Id. This is purely hypothetical and is not an accurate reflection of Best Buy’s policies or management
style.
39
Id.
40
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Analysis: Pulling Back Curtain On Hospital Prices Adds New Wrinkle In Cost
Control, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 28, 2019), https://khn.org/news/analysis-pulling-back-curtain-on-hospitalprices-adds-new-wrinkle-in-cost-control/.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
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of each procedure, service, supply prescription drug, and diagnostic test provide
at the hospital, as well as any fees associated with services, such as equipment
fees and room charges. 44
A. Artificially High List Prices Keep the Cost of Healthcare High
Hospitals set list prices at a much higher rate than the true cost of the given
procedure or service to maximize revenues. 45 A 2016 Health Affairs Study
determined that the charge-to-cost ratio (the list price divided by the Medicareallowable cost) for sampled hospitals with 50 or more beds in 2013 was 4.32. 46
The sample consisted of hospitals that were not-for-profits, for-profits and
government-run, all of which had cost-to-charge ratios of over 3.0. 47 Some
services such as CT scans have charge-to-cost ratios of almost 30, while others
like routine inpatient procedures are much lower at only 1.8. 48 These numbers
demonstrate that hospitals’ finance departments are setting list prices
significantly higher than the procedure’s cost to the hospital, essentially because
they can. 49 The lack of public transparency of list prices allows this practice to
continue, because market forces cannot come into play when the consumer is
unaware of a procedure’s cost until the bill arrives in her mailbox. 50
By way of example, Janet Winston, an English professor at Humboldt State
in California, turned to Stanford Health Care for an allergy test. 51 The allergy
test included taping 119 tiny plastic containers of various allergens to Winston’s
back over the course of three days of testing. 52 Even after a warning by the
Stanford-affiliated doctor that this extensive allergy skin-patching test may be
“expensive,” Winston was not too worried about the cost; Stanford was an in-

44
Jacqueline LaPointe, The Role of the Hospital Chargemaster in Revenue Cycle Management,
REVCYCLE INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 9, 2018), https://revcycleintelligence.com/features/the-role-of-the-hospitalchargemaster-in-revenue-cycle-management.
45
Ge Bai et al., US Hospitals Are Still Using Chargemaster Markups To Maximize Revenues, HEALTH
AFFAIRS (Sept. 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.0093.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
The George Washington University School of Business, What is a chargemaster, and what do hospital
administrators need to know about it?, ONLINE HEALTHCARE MBA BLOG (last visited Jan. 18, 2020),
https://healthcaremba.gwu.edu/blog/chargemaster-hospital-administrators-need-know/.
49
Barbara Feder Ostrov, Here’s why a health network charged $48,000 for one woman’s allergy test,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-allergy-test-bill-20181101-story.html.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
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network provider for her insurer and her employer-sponsored insurance plan
provided by the State of California had been reliable in the past. 53
After the test, the bill arrived in Winston’s mailbox. 54 Stanford’s list price
for the allergy test was $48,329. 55 To Winston’s surprise, Stanford’s list price
per tested allergen was $339 and Winston’s time with her doctor was $848. 56
Winston’s bill stated that her insurer, Anthem Blue Cross, paid Stanford a
negotiated rate of $11,376.47 for the allergy test and Stanford billed Winston
$3,103.47 as her 20% share of the negotiated rate. 57 Michael Arrigo, a San
Francisco based medical billing expert witness who reviewed Winston’s bill
stated that the “usual, customary and reasonable” charge for testing a single
allergen in the San Francisco area is about $35 and it seemed in Winston’s case
that Stanford’s list prices were inflated. 58 After some “bargaining” with
Stanford’s billing department, Winston ultimately paid $1,561.86 out of pocket,
resulting in a “50% discount.” 59
Hospitals throughout the United States can get away with this because they
set list prices for shoppable services at exorbitantly high levels, use these inflated
prices to negotiate coverage with insurers, and then pass off the residual cost to
the patient. 60 Only when the patient receives the bill and resulting sticker shock
after the procedure’s completion can the patient then haggle with the hospital’s
finance department or insurer to receive a “discount.” 61 If hospitals like Stanford
started off negotiations with insurers at a more reasonable price, it would likely
result in lower costs and lower insurance premiums. Public access to hospitals’
list prices and negotiated rates is an important first step to reigning in out of
control costs for shoppable services, because hospitals will then finally be held
publicly accountable for out of control costs of healthcare. Public access to
hospitals’ list prices may also contribute to narrowing the currently wide margin
between the same shoppable service at different providers.

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Healthcare Price Transparency Can Increase Competition and Lower
Costs
The potential lowering of the cost of healthcare and a potential increase in
patient empowerment outweighs the costs of making gross charges and
negotiated rates publicly available. 62 Transparency in shoppable service pricing
will likely have the effect of shifting patients from higher to lower-cost service
providers, which will force the hand of higher cost providers to lower prices and
increase competition. 63 This would have the effect of lowering prices of
shoppable services across the board, even for patients who do not actively
compare prices. 64 Precedent for the increase in the availability of pricing
information of a procedure resulting in a decrease in the procedure’s cost exists
for non-insured cosmetic surgeries, and there is reason to believe that an increase
in the availability of pricing information for shoppable services will have the
same desired effect. 65
Hospitals and the insurance industry argue, however, that price transparency
for shoppable services will have the effect of decreasing competition and
ultimately raise the cost of shoppable services. 66 The hospitals argue that if
prices for shoppable services are made public, then lower-cost providers will
increase prices to match other providers with higher costs for the same
services. 67 For example, the $475 provider of MRI scans in San Francisco may
face the rational incentive of raising prices closer to or matching the $6,221 cost
of the MRI scan at the higher-priced location 25 miles away. 68 Opponents of
healthcare price transparency also argue that since the healthcare market is
highly concentrated, and therefore the ability for patients to select amongst
competing providers is already limited, the engagement of a small percentage of

62
Zach Y. Brown, What would happen if hospitals openly shared their prices?, THE CONVERSATION
(Jan. 30, 2019, 6:50 AM), https://theconversation.com/what-would-happen-if-hospitals-openly-shared-theirprices-110352.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Sarah Gantz, How Lasik and Botox could point the way to health care price transparency, THE
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/health/health-costs/lasik-20180228.
html.
66
Jacqueline LaPointe, Healthcare Price Transparency Order May Up Prices, Hospitals Warn,
REVCYCLE INTELLIGENCE (June 25, 2019), https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/healthcare-pricetransparency-order-may-up-prices-hospitals-warn.
67
Id.
68
TED, What if all US health care costs were transparent? / Jeanne Pinder, YOUTUBE (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZjeZ8r7yWOk.
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patients that are expected to utilize comparative price tools will have a negligible
effect on shoppable service costs. 69
While opponents of price transparency in healthcare focus on a hypothetical
future regarding potential price collusion among healthcare providers if price
transparency is required, precedent of the injection of market forces and
competition within other U.S. industries indicates that a decrease of the cost of
care is likely to occur. 70 In 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed the Airline
Deregulation Act (ADA) into law. 71 This legislation led to the elimination of
price controls and route-setting by the now-abolished Civil Aeronautics Board.72
Since then, U.S. airline passenger volumes have increased by 210 percent—from
about 250 million in 1978 to 850 million in 2017—while inflation-adjusted
airfares have fallen by more than 40%. 73 Deregulation of the airlines led to
aggressive competition, cost-cutting and experimentation within the industry. 74
The same argument that opponents to price transparency in healthcare
currently make, that potential price collusion among healthcare providers may
lead to an overall increase in price, could have also been made about the preADA airline industry. 75 Minor airliners of the day could have increased their
price to match the exorbitantly high fares of the day, but the injection of market
forces within the industry did in fact not lead to such an outcome. 76 Air travel,
once considered to be a luxury for the wealthy, became an affordable mode of
transportation for the average American. 77 Injecting market forces within the
U.S. healthcare industry and spurring competition among providers may lead to
the same desirable effect. 78
Arguments abound on both sides of the debate pertaining to healthcare price
transparency’s effect on the prices of shoppable services, but the status quo of
opaqueness and post-procedure billing is not working for patients or their
wallets. 79 While empowering patients and encouraging competition in the
69
David Blumenthal et al., Price Transparency in Health Care Is Coming to the U.S. – But Will It
Matter?, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (July 3, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/07/price-transparency-in-health-careis-coming-to-the-u-s-but-will-it-matter.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. Carriers such as Pan Am, Eastern and TWA all disappeared soon after passage of the ADA.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Mark Galvin, Why Healthcare Pricing Stays Opaque, INS. THOUGHT LEADERSHIP (July 5, 2018),
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healthcare industry through price transparency will not be a panacea, it is a step
in the right direction to make patients’ pocketbooks a greater priority than
special interests’ bank accounts.
II. HEALTH INSURANCE TRENDS RESULT IN PATIENTS PAYING MORE OUTOF-POCKET COSTS
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 56.6% of
adults aged 18 to 64 have employment-based health insurance coverage as of
2017, down from 85.1% in 2007. 80 The percentage of enrollment in a High
Deductible Health Plan (HDHP) increased to 43.4% in 2017, up from 14.8% in
2007. 81 Since HDHP’s have higher deductibles than traditional plans, and
deductibles of traditional employer-sponsored plans are increasing, 82 patients
with employer-sponsored or HDHP insurance coverage are now paying a higher
percentage of healthcare costs out of pocket than ever before. 83 In other words,
today’s patients are paying a higher percentage, $37.7 billion to be exact, of the
absurdly high list prices for shoppable services. 84
A. High Deductible Health Plans Cause Patients to Pay More Out-Of-Pocket
Costs
The above statistics display a trend away from traditional health insurance
plans with minimal to no deductibles and a shift toward higher-deductible
plans. 85 This shift comes with a tradeoff, however. Since plans with higher
deductibles typically accompany lower premiums, health insurance can be
accessed by a greater majority of the population as premiums decrease. 86 A
problem arises when care is needed, however; the patient with high deductibles
http://insurancethoughtleadership.com/why-healthcare-pricing-remains-opaque/.
80
Robin A. Cohen, Ph.D. et al., High-deductible Health Plan Enrollment Among Adults Aged 18–64 With
Employment-based Insurance Coverage, 317 NCHS DATA BRIEF 1, 1 (2018).
81
Id.
82
Matthew Rae et al., Deductible Relief Day: How Rising deductibles are affecting people with employer
coverage, PETERSON-KFF HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (May 15, 2019), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/
deductible-relief-day-how-rising-deductibles-are-affecting-people-with-employer-coverage/.
83
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84
Amanda Frost et al., Spending on Shoppable Services in Health Care, Health Care Cost Inst. (Mar. 1,
2016),
https://healthcostinstitute.org/research/publications/hcci-research/entry/spending-on-shoppableservices-in-health-care.
85
Robin A. Cohen, Ph.D. et al., High-deductible Health Plan Enrollment Among Adults Aged 18–64 With
Employment-based Insurance Coverage, 317 NCHS DATA BRIEF 1, 1 (2018).
86
Your total costs for health care: Premium, deductible & out-of-pocket costs, https://www.healthcare.
gov/choose-a-plan/your-total-costs/.
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must pay a higher percentage of the bill than if the patient had a plan with a low
deductible.
By way of example, Dr. David Grande, a Philadelphia-area physician, was
getting his daughter ready for bed when she told him that her arm hurt from a
fall on the school’s playground. 87 Four years prior, Dr. Grande’s employer began
offering a HDHP, and at the time Dr. Grande’s family was healthy. 88 Dr.
Grande’s employer contributed $1,000 toward Dr. Grande’s $3,000 deductible
in a pre-tax Health Savings Account (HSA), so the HDHP made financial sense
at the time. 89
The next morning, Dr. Grande’s daughter received an outpatient x-ray and a
cast, and everything seemed to have gone successfully and smoothly. 90 Two
weeks later, Dr. Grande received an explanation of benefits (EOB) form from
his insurer, indicating that the negotiated price of the x-ray was $481. 91 After
receiving the EOB, Dr. Grande consulted with a cost estimator on his insurer’s
website, which informed Dr. Grande that he paid $413 more than the average
price of $68 for an x-ray in his market. 92
According to Dr. Grande, the extra price paid was a nuisance, not a
hardship. 93 He realized, however, that many families with high deductibles do
not have a health savings account or other financial reserves to absorb
unexpected healthcare expenses. 94 For example, bronze and silver plans in the
marketplaces created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act have
average deductibles of $5,181 and $2,927, respectively. 95 Low premiums of
bronze and silver plans are attractive for individuals and families because they
free disposable income that can be used for other monthly expenses, but if an
unexpected health issue does arise, then that individual or family may experience
financial disaster depending upon the size of the bill they receive weeks after the
procedure is administered. 96
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Since health insurance plans with high deductibles are more prevalent than
ever before, and patients are paying a greater percentage of healthcare costs out
of pocket, 97 pressure must be placed on both insurers and hospitals to make price
information easily accessible. Market forces may correct the immense price
margins of shoppable services over the long term, 98 but responsibility also lies
with the patient. Patients must be active in the fight to increase price
transparency of shoppable services and to utilize upcoming resources that can
make a difference in the patient’s bottom line.
B. Patients Are Paying More for Healthcare due to Surprise Out-Of-Network
Bills
Another trend surrounding today’s health insurance industry that leads to
significant headaches, both literally and financially, is receiving a “surprise” out
of network hospital bill, even though a patient received treatment from an innetwork hospital. 99 This is unfortunately an increasingly common in today’s
healthcare system, with 42% of hospital visits resulting in an out-of-network
bill. 100 Researchers estimated that patients’ potential financial responsibility for
hospital visits more than doubled between 2010 and 2016, rising to
approximately $2,000. 101
Surprise out of network bills arise when people turn to a hospital they know
is part of their insurance plan’s network, but are treated by a doctor or provider
in the hospital who does not have a contract with the insurer. 102 While “innetwork” providers agree to set rates with insurers and are not allowed to bill
patients for more than their share of that contracted rate, providers who do not
have contracts with insurers are considered out of network and can bill patients
directly for the full cost of the procedure. 103

97
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coverage, PETERSON-KFF HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (May 15, 2019), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/
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In March 2019, 15-year-old Maili McGraw was scheduled for a wisdom
tooth extraction at Nazareth Hospital in the greater Philadelphia area. 104 Maili’s
mother, Jennifer, took the time to check that the surgeon and hospital were part
of their insurance network and that the procedure would be covered by her health
insurance plan. 105 It did not occur to Jennifer, however, to ask about the
anesthesiologist. 106 It turns out that the in-network hospital contracted with an
out-of-network anesthesiologist who “surprised” her with a $2,574 bill for the
anesthesia alone. 107 What Jennifer experienced next is also an unfortunately
common trend when dealing with hospitals and insurers: after the Philadelphia
Inquirer asked Jennifer’s healthcare insurer about the bill, Independence Blue
Cross reviewed the case and found that the anesthesia bill was incorrectly
denied. 108 Besides this exceptional case where the Philadelphia Inquirer
publicized Jennifer and Maili McGraw’s case, most patients are on their own to
figure out whether the bill they’ve received is in error or truly a surprise out-ofnetwork charge. 109 Some patients may be referenced to the collections
department of the hospital and potentially face a hit to their credit rating if
payments cannot be timely made, or the patient may pay the hospital’s list price
in full. 110
A third option for patients upon receiving what appears to be an out-ofnetwork bill, negotiating with the provider for a lower rate or payment plan,
sounds an awful lot like the faux “$15,000 Best Buy television” discount
described above. 111 When Wanda Wickizer had a brain hemorrhage in 2013, a
Virginia hospital billed her $286,000 after a “20 percent uninsured” discount on
a hospital bill of $357,000. In other words, Wanda was stuck paying the
hospital’s list price for the treatment. This example, among many others that do
not gain traction in the media, refutes the notion that hospitals gross charges or
list prices are irrelevant to the consumer of shoppable services because patients
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never pay that amount. Today’s patients are in fact paying a higher percentage
of hospitals’ gross charges than ever before. 112
A possible effect of the increased cost burden on patients is increased
research into the cost of care. 113 A TransUnion Healthcare study demonstrates
that as more of the cost burden of healthcare services shifts to patients, patients
are in fact turning to available resources that can assist in evaluating the cost of
care. 114 The results of the August 2019 TransUnion Healthcare study revealed
that 75% of patients surveyed utilized either healthcare provider or insurance
websites, among other sources, to research healthcare costs. 115 The youngest
generations surveyed—Gen Z and Millennials—tended to conduct the most
research of healthcare costs. 116 Additionally, 62% of those surveyed stated that
knowing their out-of-pocket expenses in advance of service impacts the
likelihood of pursuing care. 117 It appears that an increased financial burden on
patients spurs an increase in awareness to the costs of care, and many patients
desire to have tools that can assist in making both the best medical and financial
decisions possible. 118 Executive Order 13877 and CMS rules demanding price
transparency and patient access to that data seems to be aligned with patient
desires, and greater patient use of the publicly available data appears promising,
especially with younger generations. 119
III. CONSOLIDATION OF HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS INCREASES PRICES
For the past decade, mergers or other forms of consolidation in the healthcare
industry have steadily increased. 120 Hospital administrators argue that mergers
effectively combine resources to improve quality of care, eliminate

112
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redundancies and ultimately lower costs for patients. 121 In many cases, however,
these claims are far from the truth; many hospital consolidations and mergers
eliminate competition and result in increased costs for patients. 122
When the former Jewish Hospital of St. Louis merged with Barnes Hospital
in 1996, members of the Board of Directors told the medical staff that the merger
would “improve efficiency through economies of scale.” 123 Shortly after the
merger’s completion, however, Barnes Jewish quickly developed a costly
administrative bureaucracy, tore down perfectly good buildings only to replace
them with new, often unnecessarily lavish structures, spent enormous sums on
marketing, and purchased physician practices above market value on which they
lost money. 124 Post-merger actions of the Barnes Jewish Board of Directors did
not convey a desire to consolidate for the purpose of cutting costs and passing
down the fruits of efficiency to patients. These actions are more in line with the
attempt to eliminate competition in the surrounding geographical area to
ultimately increase prices. 125
A. Mergers and Consolidations in the Healthcare Industry Eliminate
Competition and Raise the Cost of Care
Studies show that healthcare markets have become increasingly
concentrated, with a small number of firms controlling most of the business
within a given market. 126 When large hospitals or hospital systems eliminate
competition within their geographical region, price increases can be dramatic,
often exceeding 20%. 127 With the acquiring hospital increasing its regional
market share, any remaining competitors are able to match the higher price
demanded by the acquiring hospital, effectively raising the cost of care for all
patients within the region. 128 This translates into higher premiums paid by
individuals, employers and workers purchasing private insurance, higher out-of-

121
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pocket costs for patients without insurance, and higher costs to taxpayers for
government subsidized care purchased in the healthcare exchanges. 129
In addition to increased consolidation among hospitals, hospitals are
acquiring smaller physician and specialist practices at a record pace, therefore
eliminating consumer choice and competition while increasing the acquiring
hospital’s bargaining power. 130 From 2012 to 2015, the number of physician
practices employed by hospitals increased by 86%. 131 This trend takes away
consumer choice for shoppable services and results in patients paying
significantly more at the acquiring hospital than the patient would pay if the
shoppable service was administered at an independent physician’s office. 132 For
example, consider that a patient with Medicare coverage visits her independent
physician to receive an ultrasound. 133 Medicare pays the physician’s office $200
and the patient pays her co-pay, which is 20% of the bill. 134 Before the patient
returns the next month to receive an ultrasound, the independent physician’s
office is purchased by the local hospital. 135 The patient returned to receive the
same ultrasound, by the same doctor, but the cost to Medicare for the procedure
is now $400. 136 Not only did the cost of the same procedure double, but also the
monetary burden on the taxpayer and on the patient increased as well. 137
B. Reconsideration of Anti-Trust Laws is Required to Encourage Competition
Within the Healthcare Industry
The trend of increased hospital consolidation piqued the interest of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regarding the possible antitrust implications
of some transactions, but the FTC faces significant obstacles in enforcement of
antitrust law against nonprofit hospitals. 138 Federal Trade Commissioner
129
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Rebecca Kelly Slaughter is advocating for a more assertive approach to protect
competitive forces among healthcare providers, but the inability of the FTC to
enforce antitrust law against anticompetitive practices by nonprofit hospitals
hampers any effort to cease anticompetitive activity. 139 Approximately 45% of
hospitals in the United States enjoy not for profit status, so the current status of
antitrust law keeps the FTC on the sidelines, even if it is aware of post-merger
anticompetitive practices by a nonprofit hospital. 140
Hospitals’ increased acquisition of smaller, independently owned
physicians’ offices also poses problems for the FTC and other antitrust
regulators. 141 Since the deal sizes for this type of acquisition is generally small,
and investigations for antitrust violations typically occur one transaction at a
time, the FTC is unlikely to even know about increases in provider concentration
until the hospital has a controlling share of the market and is engaged in
anticompetitive practices. 142 Unless antitrust law is reconfigured to allow the
FTC to take more assertive approaches in combatting anticompetitive activity
by nonprofit hospitals in the future, the trend of increased consolidation and
increased costs to patients and taxpayers are likely to continue. 143
For healthcare price transparency to be effective in achieving the goal of
lower costs for shoppable services, competition within the healthcare
marketplace is an essential prerequisite. 144 Patient access to pricing information
is futile if there is only one system of providers within a patient’s geographical
area. 145 In an environment with increasing trends of healthcare provider merger,
consolidation, and accompanying increases in prices, bold measures must be
taken to put patients’ interests and pocketbooks, and not the healthcare
conglomerates interests, first. 146
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IV. UNINSURED COSMETIC PROCEDURES YIELD PROMISING RESULTS FOR
PRICE TRANSPARENCY
A. Prices are Transparent Within the Cosmetic Surgery Industry
Most insurance plans do not cover procedures taken on for purely cosmetic
or discretionary purposes, such as plastic surgery, or procedures such as Botox,
Lasik and hair transplant surgeries. 147 Since providers of these procedures do
not engage in back room deals with insurers, patients must pay the entire cost of
the procedure out of pocket. 148 Therefore, providers of cosmetic procedures
must make pricing information publicly available. 149 Informing patients of the
cost of cosmetic procedures before they receive them appears to narrow the
margin between the lowest and highest cost of a given procedure within a given
geographical region, effectively decreasing the procedure’s cost and increasing
competition. 150
Dr. James Lewis, a Philadelphia-area eye surgeon, engages in the truly
unconventional within the healthcare industry; he charges what makes sense in
the market. 151 Since the Lasik procedures that Dr Lewis administers are not
covered by insurance, Dr. Lewis and many other cosmetic doctors make their
prices publicly available for patients to consult before the procedure’s
administration. 152 A survey of Lasik providers in the Philadelphia area found
prices, including one year of follow-up care, ranged from Dr. Lewis’ cost of
$3,000 up to $6,000. 153 While not immaterial, the 100% price margin between
Philadelphia area Lasik procedures pales in comparison to the 2,647% price
margin for the same blood test in New Orleans, for example. 154
While a triple digit price margin still remains for cosmetic or discretionary
procedures, patients consider many factors that may lead to a disparity in price
between one cosmetic provider and another, including personal
147
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recommendations, reputation of the provider, or simply the gut feeling the
patient has upon meeting with the provider and his or her staff. 155 These nonmonetary factors certainly play a role, not only regarding cosmetic procedures,
but also in patients’ selection processes for shoppable services. Patients may
select a prestigious large hospital with an impeccable reputation of quality of
care, for instance. Patients may not realize, however, that the hospital has a
higher facility fee than smaller clinics or that demand for the large hospital’s
services may command a higher price than lesser-known providers until the bill
arrives in the mail, weeks after the procedure’s administration. 156 With market
pressures applied to hospitals through public price transparency of shoppable
services, maybe a hospital will think twice before charging a $6,000 “operating
room fee” for a routine colonoscopy if its competitor down the street is listing
its price at $1,000. 157
B. Transparency Leads to a Narrowing of Price Margins Without Sacrificing
Quality
Many more examples exist of how the $16 billion a year market for elective
cosmetic surgeries in the United States serves as an example of market forces
contributing to a lowering of costs and tightening of price margins, all without
sacrificing quality. 158 For example, the two most popular surgical cosmetic
procedures in 2017 were breast augmentation and liposuction. 159 Even though
the 2017 prices for these highly popular procedures increased in current dollar
prices by 25.5% and 28% respectively since 1998, these increases were roughly
half of the 50.3% increase in consumer prices between 1998 and 2017. 160
Therefore, the inflation-adjusted prices for breast augmentation and liposuction
procedures have fallen by 17% and 15%, respectively, since 1998. 161 The top
three nonsurgical cosmetic procedures in 2017, Botox injections, chemical peel
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and laser hair removal are also in accordance with the trend that public
availability of prices allows market forces to lower costs. 162 Nominal prices for
Botox injections have decreased by 1% from 1998 to 2017 and by more than
33% for chemical peel, while demand for both procedures has significantly
increased, by 883% and 63%, respectively. 163 It appears that the cosmetic
surgery marketplace is taking the correct approach to pricing; transparency, not
opaqueness. 164
C. Price Transparency Can Benefit Practitioners as well as Patients
In addition to individual cosmetic surgeons and practitioners that make
prices of procedures publicly available via the internet, the American Board of
Cosmetic Surgery (ABCS) also has a price range calculator of its own on the
ABCS website. 165 Potential patients have the ability to view price ranges for a
given procedure within a geographical area by entering his or her ZIP code. 166
The procedure’s price range nationally can also be viewed, in addition to
descriptions about the procedure itself. 167 This information is very useful to
patients, because it not only allows them to understand the details of a given
procedure and its potential risks, but it also makes them more knowledgeable
consumers of cosmetic services. 168 For example, if an individual decides to
consult with a local cosmetic surgeon for a facelift, and that individual consulted
the ABCS price range calculator beforehand, then that individual at the very
least has a point of comparison with other practitioners in the area with regard
to price. 169 If the given price of the facelift at the consultation is higher than the
individual planned for or can afford, then the individual is empowered by being
informed of other practitioners in the area and can plan accordingly. 170 The
power dynamic of this patient-provider relationship is in the hands of the patient;
the patient has information beforehand that is useful in obtaining services or a
procedure at a price he or she can afford. In the current marketplace of shoppable
services covered by insurance, however, hospitals and insurance companies hold
the position of power in the relationship. Hospitals and insurance companies
162
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currently play hide the ball with patients regarding the price of shoppable
services, which leads to confusion, anger, and financial distress for many
patients. 171
Transparency of pricing within the cosmetic surgery industry not only
benefits patients; many surgeons and practitioners also claim benefit from more
informed patients regarding the cost of a given procedure. 172 By way of example,
Dr. Jonathan Kaplan, MD, MPH, a plastic surgeon in the San Francisco area,
reaped the benefits of combining pricing transparency for his services in
conjunction with creating leads and increasing his patient pool for his recently
established practice. 173 Initially Dr. Kaplan had no patient contacts when he
moved to San Francisco, so obtaining contact information from individuals
qualified and legitimately interested in receiving plastic surgery services was
priority number one. 174 To achieve this goal Dr. Kaplan’s website directed
prospective patients to submit a procedure “wishlist” and contact information
via email, to which a response was given to the patient with the relevant costs of
the requested procedure. 175 Dr. Kaplan established an automated price list in the
cloud that would compile all relevant costs for a requested procedure, which sent
a reply email containing the cost information to the prospective patient. 176
In Dr. Kaplan’s experience, a major roadblock for acquiring new patients
was the cost of procedures. 177 Some patients would engage in an in-person
consultation about a procedure, its potential risks and results, but the patient
would be sticker shocked by the procedure’s cost and would ultimately decide
against moving forward with Dr. Kaplan. 178 Dr. Kaplan’s system of generating
a procedure’s cost via the cloud and automatically sending that information to
prospective patients eliminated this inefficiency by educating the patient
beforehand about price. 179 Dr. Kaplan also became more efficient through
implementing transparency of pricing within his practice. Patients that
171
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scheduled consultations were previously informed of the procedure’s cost and,
in Dr. Kaplan’s experience, were more likely to move forward with plastic
surgery than patients who were informed of a procedure’s cost upon the
commencement of the in-person consultation. 180
Price transparency skeptics argue, however, that the existence of insurance
companies, essentially acting as a middleman in the shoppable services market,
would lead price transparency initiatives to be ineffective in lowering costs of
procedures and informing potential patients of a procedure’s cost. 181 CMS’
proposed rule on hospital price transparency would require hospitals to disclose
negotiated rates between hospitals and third-party insurers, which skeptics claim
would be used by competitor hospitals and other providers as a roadmap to
bidding up prices rather than lowering costs for patients. 182 The status quo of
hospitals and insurance companies privately negotiating rates and other hidden
charges, however, stifles competition within the healthcare industry and may
contribute to an increase in prices and out-of-pocket costs to patients. 183
Currently there are no incentives for hospitals to negotiate lower rates with
insurers and there is no mechanism by which insurers can compare what other
hospitals are charging them for the same procedure. 184 Without competition
injected into these negotiations, prices will either stay at their current rates or
even increase. 185 By no longer allowing hospital-insurer negotiations to continue
behind closed doors, patients may finally be able to take control of their
healthcare by choosing a quality healthcare provider at a reasonable price, while
obtaining insurance that vigorously negotiates with hospitals on behalf of the
patient, rather than passing along a greater share of the procedure’s cost to the
patient. 186
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By using the success of transparency in pricing of cosmetic procedures as
precedent, Executive Order 13877 and CMS’ Final Rule requiring transparency
in pricing for shoppable services will have a similar, positive effect. 187 The
health insurance trend of patients having higher deductibles with employersponsored insurance and HDHPs leads to patients paying more out of pocket
costs for shoppable services, but patients do not have the current ability to shop
around before the procedure is administered to select a provider within their
budgets. 188 Even if the cosmetic surgery marketplace is transparent with pricing
out of necessity, it serves as a successful example of how publicly available
prices of services, mixed with patient empowerment and engagement, can
contribute to the narrowing of excessive margins within the greater healthcare
marketplace. 189
V. STATE-LEVEL PRICE TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVES ARE SUCCEEDING
While the national debate surrounding healthcare will certainly continue into
2020 and beyond, many states have joined in on the conversation by passing
healthcare transparency legislation of their own. 190 More than thirty states
require hospitals to disclose charges for common procedures online, it appears
that the people and their state-level representatives are successfully paving the
way toward greater healthcare price transparency and serving as a successful
example for federal involvement in the area. 191 In addition to the establishment
of greater consumer choice and knowledge in the realm of a given procedure’s
cost, the data demonstrates that state-level healthcare transparency legislation
and initiatives are reducing costs of shoppable services and increasing
competition among service providers within the states that passed such
legislation. 192
187
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Sixteen of the thirty states with enacted healthcare price transparency
legislation tackled the opaque pricing of shoppable services by creating all-payer
claims databases (APCDs), which collect and aggregate healthcare price and
quality information. 193 Eight of the sixteen states with APCDs make healthcare
price and quality information publicly available through state-based websites. 194
As the name suggests, APCDs aggregate pricing information and related data
from patients with private insurance and those utilizing state or federal
resources, such as Medicare or Medi-Cal in the state of California. 195 The
resulting APCD database provides a unique view across a state’s healthcare
marketplace. 196 From the perspective of a patient, APCDs can be used as
benchmarks regarding the costs paid by him or her relative to others within the
same geographical region. 197 If the patient’s cost for a given procedure would
be higher relative to similar claims filed for the procedure, the patient can utilize
that information to determine whether a change of insurance or healthcare
provider may result in cost savings. 198 APCDs are also effective tools for
policymakers because they provide data on the strengths or weaknesses of a
state’s healthcare market and inform policymakers of needed interventions that
would improve the market for patients. 199
A. New Hampshire and Washington’s Price Transparency Initiative Proves
Successful
New Hampshire was one of the first states to implement an APCD. 200 At the
time New Hampshire’s APCD was created, many patients in New Hampshire
lacked a sufficient number of healthcare providers, which resulted in patients
traveling long distances to access healthcare services. 201 One data point that New
Hampshire’s APCD collected was the distance that patients traveled for care
within the state, and New Hampshire’s insurance regulators used this
information to establish rules on network adequacy. 202 Not only did this APCD
193
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data provide a check on health plans that make claims that providers are located
within a certain geographical area, but it also may serve as a cost-reducing
mechanism for the out-of-pocket expenses for the procedure itself. 203 Access to
healthcare in many rural areas of the country, including areas of New
Hampshire, is limited and therefore out of pocket travel expenses must be
incurred to access services. 204 With an increasing number of patients insured by
HDHPs, travel expenses to receive services is another line item affecting the
patient’s bottom line and increases the patient’s burden to receive care. 205 By
pinpointing a previously unquantified issue, policymakers at the state level
identify and correct problems with the existing healthcare markets within their
borders to improve patient access, consumer knowledge, and efficiency of the
marketplace. 206
New Hampshire also has demonstrated success in lowering out-of-pocket
costs for shoppable services and shifting care to lower-cost healthcare providers
since implementing its healthcare price transparency website in 2007.207 In a
2019 study, Assistant Professor of Economics Zach Y. Brown, Ph.D., of the
University of Michigan, analyzed the effects of New Hampshire’s healthcare
price transparency website on patients’ out-of-pocket costs over the five-year
period subsequent to the website’s creation. 208 Assistant Professor Brown’s
study revealed that individuals saved approximately $7.9 million and payers
saved $36 million on x-rays, CT scans and MRI scans over the five-year
period. 209 By year five, patients’ out-of-pocket costs were eleven percent lower
and patients with deductibles saw almost a twenty-two percent savings after five
years. 210
In 2018, the State of Washington launched its WAHealthCareCompare
website, which informs patients of the average price of many shoppable services,
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such as x-rays, colonoscopies, and eye exams to name a few. 211 By requesting
the type of procedure and entering a ZIP code, a patient can gain immediate
information about the procedure itself, the average price of the procedure in the
State of Washington, and typical low and high prices for the procedure in
different ZIP codes throughout the State. 212 The website also provides a listing
of healthcare service providers within the given ZIP code, the cost of the
requested procedure at the given provider, as well as information about how the
quality of care at a given provider compares to other providers statewide. 213 The
website also contains a cost calculator, allowing a patient to enter the estimated
cost of a procedure given by the website, input insurance information such as
the patient’s deductible, co-insurance percentage or co-pay amount to receive a
bottom-line estimate of the patient’s out-of-expenses for the procedure. 214
B. Kentucky’s Transparency Tool Saves Public Employees Millions
The experiments of making the cost of shoppable services publicly
accessible has indicated a resulting trend of lower costs of care. Across the
country, state governments spend in excess of $30 billion to insure roughly 2.7
million public employee households. 215 Among state and local governments,
roughly 89% of workers are offered health benefits, and 79% of these workers
enroll in a health benefit program. 216 Between 2008 and 2011, Kentucky
increased the amount that state employees could contribute to their health
insurance by 55%. 217 By 2012, however, the average total premium for an
employee and dependents was still over $1,200 per month. 218 To control costs,
Kentucky then increased deductibles in two of their more popular plans—
achieving some cost control but also increasing employee out-of-pocket costs,
which turned out to be an unpopular move by the State. 219
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Kentucky searched for new approaches to keep health care costs under
control while lessening the financial burden on state employees. 220 Without
consumer friendly access to healthcare price information and a lack of incentive
to do so, Kentucky developed mechanisms by which public employees could
shop for the best-valued shoppable services. 221 In 2013, Kentucky implemented
the Vitals SmartShopper program, a technologically-enabled third-party service
designed to share price information for various healthcare procedures, including
shoppable services. 222 In addition to making prices for shoppable services
publicly available to the entire populous of Kentucky, Vital SmartShopper offers
incentives to Kentucky’s public employees and retirees to utilize the information
and make lower-cost healthcare decisions. 223 For example, if a Kentucky public
employee visits her doctor who subsequently recommends a certain shoppable
service, she could then consult the Vital SmartShopper website to discover what
providers offer the best price for the required procedure. 224 If the provider
chosen is one that Vital SmartShopper has established as qualified under the
program, the public employee will receive a reward check in the mail within
forty-five to sixty days of her claim being paid. 225
The shopper program has been popular among public employees. 226
Through mid-2018, about 42% of eligible households used the program to look
up information about prices and rewards, and 57% of those employees actively
chose a more cost-effective provider. 227 While skeptics argue that shopping
incentives will lead to lower-quality care, that does not seem to be the case with
the Kentucky experiment. 228 Public employees in Kentucky are now better
informed; they can make decisions on where to receive shoppable healthcare
services based on location, quality and cost. 229 The lowest priced option is not
always chosen and many Kentucky public employees choose a costlier
procedure, foregoing the maximum or even a slight cash incentive. 230
Kentucky’s experience has shown that empowering patients with a price
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transparency tool results in both taxpayer savings and direct savings, in addition
to providing incentives to members without sacrificing quality. 231
Results indicate that healthcare providers within Kentucky are not as
opposed to the Vital SmartShopper program as one might think. 232 In response
to Kentucky’s price transparency initiative, some hospitals and imaging centers
have become aware that their prices are high and have lowered their prices to
rank higher on the lists provided to patients. 233 For example, one high-cost
regional hospital inquired how much they would need to lower their imagine
rates to be listed competitively in the shopper program. 234 Working with the
provider and the health plan, the hospital lowered their imaging rates for MRIs
and CT scans by roughly 30% to rank higher in the shopper program. 235
Similarly, some providers that are already low-cost have reached out to Vitals
to provide more information about additional services that they also offer at their
locations at competitive prices, which can help expand the set of services eligible
for incentives. 236
Savings by Kentucky public employees have been significant over the life
of the Vital SmartShopper program. 237 According to data from the state through
mid-2018, Vitals SmartShopper has saved state taxpayers a total of $13.2 million
in health care costs. 238 Over 19,000 incentives have been paid to members for a
total of $1,919,460 back into the pockets of public employees. 239 The average
savings to the state per claim that was shopped is $546. 240 Kentucky’s Vital
SmartShopper program, along with the other state initiatives geared toward price
transparency of shoppable services, serves as an example of the effectiveness of
informing patients of hospitals’ list prices, negotiated rates with insurers, and
out-of-pocket costs. 241 By empowering patients with information, patients
across the country will finally be able to make healthcare decisions based not
only on the quality and easy accessibility of care, but also by cost. 242 While a
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national model designed off of the various state price transparency initiatives
would require more fortitude and data to establish, state initiatives demonstrate
that price transparency surrounding shoppable services can lead to lower out of
pocket costs for patients in the long-term, increase consumer choice, and can
contribute to increased competition within the healthcare industry. 243
CONCLUSION
Justice Louis Brandeis once said, “Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” 244 While this
statement was made over a century ago, it represents sound advice in solving
today’s problem of the exorbitantly high cost of healthcare in the United
States. 245 The injection of transparency into the currently opaque status quo of
privately-negotiated pricing between hospitals and insurers, obscure list prices
generated by hospitals, and the inability of patients to gain meaningful
information to make the best health and financial decisions for themselves and
their families requires immediate action and attention. 246 Exposure of hospitals’
list prices and negotiated rates to public scrutiny is a necessary predicate to
reverse the trend of increasing costs of healthcare in the United States. 247 The
current system allows one of the largest industries in the nation to be insulated
from market forces, and as a result, patients pay a very high price. 248
As deductibles rise and the percentage of Americans with HDHPs increases,
patients will be paying a higher percentage of the cost of shoppable services outof-pocket. 249 While HDHPs benefit relatively healthy patients through the
incentive of lower monthly premiums, significant financial hardship may arise
if an unexpected injury occurs and a plethora of scans and procedures are needed
to remedy the problem. 250 Price transparency is an essential vehicle to create
greater patient involvement with their healthcare in addition to lessening the
243
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financial burden on patients who are now paying more healthcare costs out-ofpocket than ever before. 251
Vertical consolidations between hospitals and independent physician groups
and horizontal consolidations among hospitals limits consumer choice and raises
costs for patients. 252 The United States’ healthcare industry is highly
concentrated, and with healthcare costs higher than they have ever been it is
difficult to see how cost savings are being funneled down to patients. 253 Price
transparency in healthcare is the necessary first step toward lowering the cost of
shoppable services for patients, but federal enforcement of antitrust law is also
needed to provide choices for patients and to inject competitive forces within the
industry. 254
Price transparency efforts by state governments and the uninsured cosmetic
surgery industry have shown signs of success, and they serve as precedent in the
likelihood of CMS’ Final Rule lowering prices of shoppable services,
encouraging patient involvement and increasing competition within the national
healthcare industry. 255 The cosmetic surgery industry’s success of narrowing
cost margins for procedures, informing patients of the financial burden of
procedures beforehand, and maintaining competitive forces among providers
within a given geographical region will likely have the same effect within the
shoppable services market. 256 The injection of competitive forces is likely to
narrow the margin for a given procedure towards the average, because many
patients will choose a less costly option without sacrificing the quality of the
procedure. 257 And as Kentucky, Washington and many other states have shown,
empowering patients with choices in an environment of increasing out-of-pocket
251
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costs is a resource that can lower costs of shoppable services, even for those who
do not actively use pricing information or receive the lowest cost procedure. 258
As healthcare costs in the United States continue to rise, 259 more states
should follow the lead of Kentucky and other proactive states in the area of price
transparency of shoppable services. 260 Kentucky’s Vital SmartShopper program
is as an exemplar for a proactive solution to the problem of rising healthcare
costs combined with patients bearing more of a direct financial burden resulting
from higher deductibles. 261 By making constituents aware of available cost
comparison tools, establishing efficient registration mechanisms and
periodically reminding individuals about available cost savings, many more
states can help offset out-of-pocket costs while empowering patients with
choices. 262
A majority of Americans are currently attempting to access cost information
pertaining to healthcare and this number will likely continue to grow as a higher
percentage of healthcare costs are placed on the patient. 263 While CMS’ Final
Rule will provide the tools by which patients can become even more actively
involved in their healthcare, the onus is on the patient to utilize this invaluable
resource. 264 The longstanding healthcare debate will certainly continue into the
2020 election and beyond, but for the first time patients are being put first instead
of special interests that benefit from a status quo of keeping healthcare prices
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behind a veil of secrecy. 265
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